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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case arises out of the loss of the recording of an unemployment benefits hearing 
before the Appeals Bureau of the Idaho Department of Labor (hereinafter "Department"), 
necessitating a remand and an otherwise unnecessary second hearing before the Department, 
resulting in damages to the Appellant in the form of delayed benefits, attorneys fees, and other 
damages incurred as a direct and proximate result of the Department's loss of said recording. 
Following the second hearing, which resulted in another ruling that was adverse to Appellant, 
Appellant again appealed to the Idaho Industrial Commission, and was ultimately successful. 
Within one hundred and eighty (180) days from the Industrial Commission's decision, Appellant 
submitted a formal Notice of Tort Claim, through counsel, seeking damages for the loss of the 
recording at the initial hearing, and, once denied, Appellant filed the instant suit in the District 
Court. Complaint 2-5 (Record (R.) at 15-18). However, prior to the formal Notice of Tort 
Claim, Appellant had also written to various State officials regarding the issue, setting forth in 
his correspondence elements which would satisfy the Idaho Tort Claims Act ("1.T.C.A."), Idaho 
Code § 6-905, under Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 621-22, 586 P.2d 1062, 1065-66 
(1978). R. at 59-63, 107-11, 153-61, and 181-86. Respondent claims that this correspondence 
never reached the Secretary of State's office and, therefore, was not properly presented pursuant 
the I.T.C.A. Third Declaration of Lisa Mason ,r,r 4-6 (R. at 130-31). 
In response to the suit, Respondents moved to dismiss, on the grounds, inter alia, that the 
Notice of Tort Claim was not brought within one-hundred and eighty days from the Department's 
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last decision against Appellant. See Memorandum in Support of I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) Motion to 
Dismiss (R. at 23-31 ). The District Court ultimately granted the Motion, and denied post-
judgment motions challenging the same, on the grounds that the tort claim was presented within 
one-hundred and eighty days of the Department's adverse decision (rather than the Industrial 
Commission's favorable decision), and, since there was no proof that Appellant's prior 
correspondence reached the Secretary of State's Office, the prior correspondence was not 
properly presented. Memorandum Decision and Order Granting I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) Motion to 
Dismiss (hereinafter "First Memorandum Decision") (R. 73-89). It is from the final decision 
upholding the dismissal that Appellants appeal. However, Appellant did not, and could not, 
realize whether or not he was damaged, and the extent of his damages, until the date the 
Industrial Commission issued its ruling in his favor. As such, Appellants submit that the 
deadline for submitting a Notice of Tort Claim would have began running on that date. 
Alternatively, Appellants submit that the prior correspondence satisfied the requirements of the 
Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
This matter was filed in District Court on March 20, 2017. Respondents filed their 
Motion to Dismiss on June 21, 2017, which was heard on September 6, 2017. The Decision 
granting their Motion was issued on September 14, 2017. Appellants then filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration on September 28, 2017, which was heard on November 8, 2017. The Decision 
denying the Motion was issued on November 15, 2017. Appellants then made a Motion for 
Additional Findings of Fact and Motion to Set Aside the Judgment, again challenging the 
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Dismissal, on November 29, 2017. That Motion was heard on January 31, 2018, and denied on 
February 13, 2018. Appellant then timely appealed the same. 
C. Concise Statement of the Facts 
On or about August 5, 2015, the Idaho Department of Labor Appeals Bureau held a 
hearing on Appellant's appeal of a denial of unemployment benefits, subsequently issued a 
decision unfavorable to Appellant. Appellant considered the decision of Mark Richmond, the 
Hearing Examiner who conducted the hearing and made the decision, to be grossly contrary to 
the facts presented at the hearing, and his supervisor, Appeals Director Amy Hohnstein, was 
contacted. 
Ms. Hohnstein informed Appellant's wife, Rose Johnson, that she would personally 
review the audio of the hearing of August 5, 2015. Declaration of Rose Johnson,, 6 (R. at 151). 
Shortly thereafter, Ms. Hohnstein refused to acknowledge whether or not she listened to the 
audio or not, and directed Appellant to Appeal if he was not satisfied with the decision. Id At 
no time was Appellant informed by Ms. Hohnstein that the audio file record was missing. 
Appellant then requested a copy of the hearing and was informed via IDOL records custodian, 
Georgia Smith, that it was missing or never recorded, and she apologized for the problem. 
Appellant's attempt to appeal the decision to the Idaho Industrial Commission was thus 
remanded, due to the recording of the hearing being missing and no transcript being available 
from the Idaho Department of Labor. Even though Appellant's wife, Rose Johnson, had 
transcribed the hearing and offered the recording and transcript to Department of Labor officials, 
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it was rejected on the grounds that it was not "official," as it was not generated by the 
Department. 
After remand, another hearing was held on or about October 22, 2015, which was 
conducted more or less in the nature of a status conference, and subpoenas for Appellant's 
witnesses, but not for the production of documents, were granted. Another hearing was then held 
on November 12, 2015. However, despite being subpoenaed, one witness who was then a 
current employee of Appellant's employer appeared to have given an incorrect telephone 
number, and Paul Norton, an officer of Appellant's employer failed to appear. Appellant was 
informed at the hearing that Mr. Norton had previously informed the Department of his 
unavailability, but the Department neglected or failed to pass this relevant information on to 
Appellant or his counsel when said communication occurred. Separately, the Department 
allowed ex-parte communication in an eleven-page fax, the entirety of which has not been 
disclosed to Appellant. 
After the conclusion of the hearing the decision from the Department of Labor was 
ultimately issued, and was, again, not in Appellant's favor. Appellant appealed to the Idaho 
Industrial Commission, and, ultimately, the Industrial Commission found in his favor in a 
decision issued on or about April 29, 2016. Both the employer (who, up until that point, had not 
participated in any of the proceedings below) and the Department then filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration, which was denied on or about September 26, 2016. R. at 190-225. 
During this time, Appellant sent various written communications to a broad variety of 
State officials, including the Governor's Office, the Attorney General's Office, and the Director 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 4 
of the Department of Labor. In response to this correspondence, an employee of the Governor's 
Office by the name of Nick Stout noted as early as January of 2016 that this matter was likely to 
be litigated. It is unknown where, or to whom, in State Government this correspondence was 
directed. Comments were made after the letter sent by Appellant to state offices, including the 
Governor. The State has, thus far, declined to respond to specific questions posed regarding this 
issue. Declaration of Rose Johnson, passim. As such, the only manner in which Appellant may 
compel responses to his questions, concerning the handling of said correspondence, would be to 
propound discovery, the opportunity for which was denied by the District Court. 
In the interim, after receiving the initial favorable decision from the Idaho Industrial 
Commission, but prior to receiving a decision on the Motions for Reconsideration, Appellant's 
counsel sent a formal Notice of Tort Claim to the Secretary of State's Office. In response, 
Counsel received a letter from the State's insurer, which entirely failed to address the issues 
raised, and failed to dispute the timeliness of the claim. Affidavit of James McMillan (R. at 
226). Appellant then ultimately filed the instant case, which Defendants moved to dismiss, 
which was ultimately granted by the District Court. In doing so, the District Court held that 
Appellant's cause of action accrued on the date of the second hearing, and that the prior 
correspondence was not properly presented to the Secretary of State. See First Memorandum 
Decision (R. at 73-89). Appellants then moved to reconsider, and moved to alter/amend/set 
aside the Judgment, in addition to requesting an opportunity to conduct discovery, in order to 
determine, in part, whether or not Mr. Johnson's prior correspondence had, or should have, been 
forwarded to the Secretary of State's office, which pertains directly to the presentment issue. 
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Both motions were denied, with the District Court essentially using the same reasonmg. 
Appellant now appeals. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Appellant presents the following Issues on Appeal: 
a. Did the District Court err in granting Respondents' Motion to Dismiss and, 
in doing so, did the District Court err in weighing evidence and deciding a disputed fact 
to be decided by a jury; and, in its decision, did it err in determining the date of accrual 
for the purposes of the Idaho Tort Claims Act and/or err in finding that a valid 
presentment had not occurred prior to submission of the formal Notice of Tort Claim? 
b. Did the District Court err in denying Appellant's Motion for 
Reconsideration and in denying Appellant's Motion for Additional Discovery? 
c. Did the District Court err in denying Appellant's Motion for 
Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law? 
d. Did the District Court err in Denying Appellant's Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment? and 
e. Did the District Court err in denying Appellant's Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment? 
f. Did the District Court err in denying Appellant the Opportunity to Present 
Testimony at the hearing on his Post-Judgment Motions? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
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A Motion to Dismiss which relies upon information outside of the existing record is to be 
treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court reviews a grant of Summary Judgment de 
novo. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832, 243 P.3d 642, 648 (2010). A Motion for 
Reconsideration is reviewed pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard. Antim v. Fred Meyer 
Stores, Inc., 251 P.3d 602, 610 (2011 ), and a Motion for Additional Findings or to Set Aside are also 
reviewed pursuant to an Abuse of Discretion standard. 
B. The District Court erred in granting Respondents' Motion to Dismiss. 
1. Standard for Summary Judgment. 
Even though the Motion is presented as a "Motion to Dismiss," since the District Court 
relied upon information outside of the existing record, the Court treated Defendants' Motion as a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. In ruling upon a Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court 
must consider whether or not "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is ... [a] genuine issue as to any material fact," and 
whether the Respondents are "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
Further, "[ s ]tandards applicable to summary judgment require the district court ... to liberally 
construe facts in the existing record in favor of the nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable 
inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party." Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 
541, 808 P .2d 87 6, 878 ( 1991) ( emphasis added) ( construing Idaho Rule Civil Procedure 56( c ), 
modeled after, and substantially similar to, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)). 
Moreover, in hearing a Motion for Summary Judgment, "it is not the judge's function to 
weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. There is [an] 
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issue for trial [if] there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return 
a verdict for that party." Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 410, 797 P.2d 117, 118 (1990) 
(emphasis added, internal quotations and citations removed). The First Circuit further explained 
the term "genuine" as being "sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational fact.finder to resolve 
the issue in favor either side." National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 
(1995). In the same case, it further defined "material" as "a fact that has the capacity to sway the 
outcome of the litigation under the applicable law." Id. To put it another way, as the summary 
judgment standard is often explained, summary judgment is appropriate only if "reasonable 
minds cannot differ" as to the position offered by the moving party, based upon the evidence 
available in the record. 
Since, based upon the evidence currently in the record, a rational trier of fact could 
reasonably find that (1) Appellants did not discover their cause of action until the receipt of the 
Industrial Commission's decision on April 29, 2016; and/or (2) that Appellant's prior 
correspondence with the Department of Labor, and other State agencies, qualified as a valid 
presentment of a Tort Clam under Smith v. City of Preston, Summary Judgment was not proper in 
this case. 
2. Accrual of Appellant's Cause of Action for Negligence. 
Initially, the District Court held that Appellant's cause of action accrued on the date of the 
second Appeals Bureau decision (November 25, 2015) and, therefore, began the one-hundred-
eighty (180) day period on that date. First Memorandum Decision at 15 (R. at 87). However, 
said decision was not favorable to Appellant. Therefore, while attorneys' fees from the second 
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hearing could have been determined at that point, the significant additional financial damages 
resulting from the delay in the payment of benefits could not have been determined at that point, 
as it had not yet been determined that Mr. Johnson was going to be entitled to benefits. Also, 
Appellant could not have anticipated the representations and subsequent conduct of the 
Department during and following the proceedings before the Industrial Commission, including 
presenting discredited and refuted testimony and information to the Industrial Commission (the 
Industrial Commission, by way of its denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, accepted 
Appellant's evidence and testimony over those of Respondent). See R. at 260-76 (Respondent's 
Motion for Reconsideration before the Industrial Commission and R. at 190-225 (Industrial 
Commission's decisions). Respondent's Motions for Reconsideration filed to the Commission 
further prolonged the matter, and it should be noted that Respondent's current counsel's 
representation of the Department began following that date, along with his participation in 
advising the Department on Appellant's public records requests. 
Moreover at the point claimed by Respondent as the accrual date, November 25, 2015, 
the only incurred damages which Mr. Johnson could determine with any degree of certainty were 
borrowed funds for living expenses and attorneys' fees and costs. Mr. Johnson, as the, then, non-
prevailing party, may likely have only been entitled to bring a cause of action solely for 
attorneys' fees as damages. It was not until he received the Industrial Commission's decision on 
or about April 29, 2016, that Mr. Johnson discovered that he suffered additional damages in the 
form of a delay in payment of benefits. Declaration of Dale Johnson, ,r 2 (R. at 177) 
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Unlike in the case of an intentional tort, a cause of action for negligence does not accrue 
until the Plaintiff has suffered actual damage as a direct and proximate result of said negligence. 
See, e.g., Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 254, 678 P.2d 41, 46 (1984) ("it is axiomatic that 
in order to recover under a theory of negligence, the plaintiff must prove actual damage."). Until 
the favorable Industrial Commission decision of April 29, 2016, Appellant had no way of 
knowing if, in fact, he would be entitled to damages as a result of the delay in the grant of 
benefits, let alone the extent of said damages. The Idaho Court of Appeals has also held that "a 
claimant 'discovers' his claim against the governmental entity only when he becomes fully 
apprised of the injury or damage and of the governmental entity's role. The question of when the 
claimant should have discovered the governmental entity's role is a question of material fact 
which, if genuinely disputed, is inappropriate for determination on Summary Judgment." 
Carman v. Carman, 114 Idaho 551, 553, 758 P.2d 710, 712 (Ct. App. 1988). Laying aside, for a 
moment, the fact that, even at this point, absent further discovery, the full extent of the 
governmental entity's role is unclear, Mr. Johnson did not and could not have become fully 
apprised of the injury or damage until the issuance of the favorable Industrial Commission 
decision, at the earliest. Therefore, the District Court erred in its determination that Appellant's 
cause of action accrued at the time of the unfavorable Department of Labor decision in 
November of 2015. 
While there are instances in which this Court and the Court of Appeals have held that the 
cause of action accrues at the time of the occurrence, such as Ralphs v. City of Spirit Lake 98 
Idaho 225, 560 P.2d 1315 (1977) and Mallory v. City of Montpelier, 126 Idaho 446, 885 P.2d 
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1162 (Ct. App. 1994), these cases may be distinguished on the basis that they involved personal 
injuries in which the nature of the injury was, to a great extent, clear at the time of the incident, 
or shortly thereafter. The Plaintiff in Ralphs was clearly aware that he had been attacked and 
injured at the time of the occurrence, and the Plaintiff in Mallory was clearly aware that she had 
fallen and injured herself at the time of the occurrence, and could have filed immediately. In this 
case, however, Mr. Johnson could not have filed a claim seeking damages for the delay in 
payment of his unemployment benefits either immediately upon discovering the loss of the 
recording, nor upon the issuance of the second unfavorable decision, as he did not know that 
there would ever be any benefits paid until the Industrial Commission made that determination. 
This case is more akin to the situation in Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 630 P.2d 685 
(1981). The ongoing nature of the proceedings are more analogous to an ongoing "project", or 
continuing tort rather than a single injury that may have become aggravated at a later date. In 
Farber, the Court stated that: 
The purposes of LC. § 6-905 are to (1) save needless expense and litigation by 
providing an opportunity for amicable resolution of the differences between 
parties, (2) allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into the cause of the 
injury in order to determine the extent of the state's liability, if any, and (3) allow 
the state to prepare defenses. Unless the contract and all of the acts performed 
pursuant to the contract have been completed, it would be difficult for the state to 
determine the nature or extent of its liability or prepare a defense to any claim. 
Furthermore, if parties can present the state with a complete and definite claim for 
damages arising from the continuing tort, then the state may attempt a settlement 
on the basis of clearly ascertainable facts. If we were to adopt a contrary view, 
settlements would either be based on pre-completion, speculative damages, or 
would have to await the completion of the project. A strict or literal interpretation 
of the notice requirements of the ITCA would result in denying the legitimate 
claims of those who have suffered injury at the hands of the state, without 
furthering in the least the legislative purposes behind the statute. 
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Farber, 102 Idaho at 401-02, 630 P.2d at 688-89. As in Farber, if the Court were to have 
required Appellant to bring a claim immediately upon the second unfavorable decision, and the 
claim were to settle, said settlement would likewise be "based on pre-completion, speculative 
damages or would have to await completion" of the appeals process, which would frustrate the 
policy behind the Idaho Tort Claims act as laid out by the Idaho Supreme Court in that decision. 
Therefore, this Court should VACATE the decision of the District Court with regard to the 
date on which the period in which to file the Notice of Tort Claim accrued, and REMAND 
accordingly. 
3. Presentment. 
Alternatively, a rational trier of fact could reasonably find that Appellant's prior 
correspondence with the Department of Labor and the State of Idaho satisfies the requirements of 
the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The District Court held, in its original decision, that it was 
"undisputed" that the prior correspondence was never directed to the Secretary of State, and 
essentially interprets Turner v. City of Lapwai, 157 Idaho 659, 339 P.3d 544 (2014) as creating a 
strict requirement that the Notice, whether entitled as such or not, be received by the Secretary in 
order to satisfy the terms of the ITCA. See First Memorandum Decision at 12 (R. at 84). 
However, this Court has recognized that, if the Notice is subsequently presented to the Secretary, 
the Presentment requirement is satisfied. CNW, L.L.C. v. New Sweden Irrigation District, 161 
Idaho 89,383 P.3d 1259 (2016). 
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This Court's decisions in Turner and CNW leave two important questions unanswered: 
(1) If the Notice is received by an employee other than the Secretary prior to the expiration of 
the 180 day deadline, but said employee does not deliver it until after the expiration of the 
deadline, is the presentment requirement satisfied upon receipt of the employee or the Secretary; 
and (2) do State or Subdivision employees have a duty to present claims that could reasonably 
interpreted as Tort Claims, providing notice of potential litigation, to the Secretary for 
processing? In CNW, the claim was immediately presented to the Secretary, and so the 
Presentment requirement was held to be satisfied. In Turner, the claim was presented to the 
Mayor and a City Councilman, elected officials who arguably have no duty or authority to 
address the claim. This case falls in between CNW and Turner - Mr. Johnson's correspondence 
was presented to State employees who have a duty to direct received correspondence to the 
appropriate person or department, rather than being directed to officials who have no duty or 
ability to process the same. As such, in light of the policy behind the ITCA as set forth in Farber 
hereinabove, that the answer to both questions should be in the affirmative. 
This Court has allowed documents to stand as satisfying the Notice requirement, even if 
they do not follow a specific form, so long as their contents substantially comply. Smith v. City 
of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 621-22, 586 P.2d 1062, 1065-66 (1978). In this case, the Johnsons 
received an explicit admission from a State employee that their prior correspondence indicated 
Mr. Johnson's intent to litigate this issue as early as January of 2016. Declaration of Rose 
Johnson, Exhibits A and B (R. at 153-57). See also Declaration of Dale Johnson, Exhibit A (R. 
at 107-11) (correspondence from Dale Johnson dated December of 2015). At that point, the 
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State was clearly on notice of potential litigation, and had the opportunity to begin to prepare for 
the same. Having received and acknowledged this notice, Appellant submits that the State 
employee then not only had a duty to, but possibly may have, passed the information on to the 
appropriate and necessary personnel and channels, including the Secretary of State's Office, to be 
processed as a Tort Claim. To hold otherwise would lead to absurd results and frustrate the 
purpose of the statute. For example, if State or Subdivision employees were held not to have a 
duty to send what they recognize as possible tort claims to the appropriate authority, the State 
could essentially immunize itself from tort liability by directing its mailroom staff and 
receptionists to hold all notices of tort claims for 181 days, thus creating a de facto personal 
service requirement. This was clearly not the Legislature's intent. As such, the District Court 
was in error in determining that a presentment either had not taken place, or that the lack of 
presentment directly to the Secretary of State, under these particular facts, failed to satisfy the 
requirements of the I.T.C.A. 
Finally, given the fact that the State clearly admits that, as early as January of 2016, it had 
notice that litigation was possible, its false assurances that Mr. Johnson's complaints would be 
properly addressed, and Mr. Johnson's reliance upon said assurances as set forth in his 
Declaration, R. at 177-79, the State should be held to be ESTOPPED from asserting lack of 
notice as a defense. 
C. The District Court erred in Denying Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration 
and in denying Appellant's Motion for Additional Discovery. 
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Following the grant of Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, Appellant timely filed for 
reconsideration. "A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may 
be made at any time before the entry of final judgment, but not later than fourteen (14) days after 
the entry of final judgment." Idaho R. Civ. P. 1 l(a)(2)(B). "When considering a motion for 
reconsideration under Rule ll(a)(2), the district court should take into account any new facts, 
law, or information presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the district 
court's interlocutory oder. However, new evidence is not required and the moving party can re-
argue the same issues in addition to new arguments." Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 
808, 291 P.3d 1000, 1007 (2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Johnson v. 
Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 (Ct. App. 2006) ("the case law in applying 
Rule ll(a)(2)(B) permits a party to present new evidence when a motion is brought under that 
rule, but does not require that the motion be accompanied by new evidence."). Appellant, by 
way of the same Motion, sought additional discovery, in order to address the issues as to whether 
the Johnsons' repeated correspondence to the State either had been, or should have been, directed 
to the Secretary of State for treatment as a Tort Claim. Record at 100-03. 
The District Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, largely upon the same 
reasoning as in its grant of the Motion to Dismiss. The District Court then summarily denied 
Appellant's Motion for Additional Discovery, without setting forth its reasoning for doing so. 
Memorandum Decision Denying Motion for Reconsideration, R. at 248-52. For the reasons set 
forth in the preceding section, given that the District Court was in error in granting Respondents' 
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Motion to Dismiss, the District Court likewise abused its discretion in denying Appellant's 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
With regard to the denial of the Motion for Additional Discovery, Respondent had filed 
its Motion to Dismiss at an early stage of the case, prior to Appellant having an opportunity to 
conduct adequate Discovery. Appellant attempted, throughout the course of the proceedings, to 
continue to investigate in order to gather relevant information that may be in the hands of 
Respondents, including seeking the disclosure of various documents and information that would 
reveal how, in fact, his prior correspondence with the Department should have been handled, 
which bears directly upon Plaintiffs alternative theory that there may have been a "presentment" 
of a tort claim based upon said correspondence. Declaration of Dale Johnson, ,r 1 (R. at 310-11 ); 
Declaration of Rose Johnson, ,r 10 (R. at 289). 
At Oral Argument on Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, counsel for Respondents 
(who also represented the Department during Plaintiffs Appeal to the Industrial Commission, 
and who has been advising the Department with regard to Plaintiffs records requests), stated that 
Plaintiffs request for the opportunity for discovery could result in "hundreds" of depositions 
being scheduled, Declaration of Dale Johnson, ,r 5, (R, at 311 ), despite the fact that Appellant 
never made such an absurd and irrational request. Respondent was similarly incorrect in its 
statement to the District Court that there was no duty for the Department to preserve records. Id. 
Idaho Code§ 72-1368(6) clearly requires and details Department's duties to preserve all records. 
Further, in response to a records request by Plaintiff, the Department quoted a fee in the amount 
of approximately one-hundred-fifty dollars ($150), which indicates that it would require the 
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production of records in excess of one-hundred (100) pages and/or two (2) hours of staff work 
(but without an itemization of the number of excess pages or hours). Idaho Code § 72-104(10). 
Moreover, the Department's responses have been often non-responsive and/or indicate confusion 
over Plaintiffs requests. Declaration of Dale Johnson, ,i 1 (R. at 311 ); Declaration of Rose 
Johnson, Exhibit B (R. at 154-57, 292-305). Taken together, this indicates that there may be 
significant relevant evidence available, that may possibly expose the Respondents to further 
liability, in Respondents' possession, that may only be compelled to be disclosed via the 
Discovery process. 
Finally, was the District Court in procedural error in allowing Respondent Counsel to 
make out of order rebuttal statement in the November 8, 2017 hearing after Appellant gave 
closing argument - and while subsequently not inviting Appellant to counter the out of order 
rebuttal? Appellant's counsel had argued that, pursuant to the "some damage"rule, Appellant had 
no cause of action until Appellant had discovered the full extent of his damages, while the 
District Court allowed Respondent to continue to provide further argument after Appellant, the 
then-moving party, to submit his argument, as is shown by the transcript on file herein. 
D. The District Court Erred in Denying Appellant's Subsequent Post-judgment 
Motions. 
Following the denial of Reconsideration, Appellant filed a Motion for Additional 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, based upon its lack of the same in its denial of 
Appellant's Motion for Additional Discovery, as well as a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment 
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b ), which may also be treated as a Motion to 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 17 
Alter/Amend under Rule 59(e). First Sec. Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598, 603, 570 P.2d 276, 
281 (1977). One of the purposes of a Motion under 59( e) is "to correct errors both of fact and 
law that had occurred in its proceedings." and "[provide] a mechanism to circumvent appeal." 
Id. 
In denying Appellant's Motion, one of the bases on which the District Court's decision is 
the issue of timeliness. However, in light of the fact that: (1) a Motion for Reconsideration tolls 
the time for appeal; and (2) a motion under Rule 60(b) may also be considered pursuant to Rule 
59(e) which, in tum, pursuant to Neibaur, is a method to avoid appeal at the District Court level, 
the logical conclusion would be that the Motion for Reconsideration tolled the time in which to 
file a Motion under Rule 59(e) as well. Since Appellant's Post-judgment Motions were filed 
within fourteen (14) days of the District Court's decision denying said motions, the post-
judgment Motions, as well as the instant appeal, were timely filed. Otherwise, the District Court 
again erred in affirming its prior decisions based upon its previous reasoning, for the reasons set 
forth hereinabove. 
Further, Appellant has set forth sufficient grounds to set aside the judgment, pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) for "unique and compelling circumstances." See, e.g. 
Maynard v. Nguyen, 152 Idaho 724, 726, 275 P.3d 589, 591 (2011). Deprived of the ability to 
conduct further Discovery, Appellants attempted to continue investigate the existence of possible 
additional evidence in this case by submitting public records requests to the Department. 
Declaration of Dale Johnson, 'i[ 9. (R. at 312) As set forth in the Declarations of Plaintiff and his 
wife, the Department, apparently acting pursuant to the advice of the same counsel as is 
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representing it in the instant case, has consistently delayed its responses, claimed a lack of 
understanding, and sought fees for the requested copies, without specifying the number of pages 
in excess of one-hundred or hours in excess of two that would justify these additional charges. 
Id., Exhibit A. (R. at 314-15). 
Coupled with the representations of Respondent's counsel that allowing discovery could 
result in depositions of a large number of witnesses, this indicates that there may be a significant 
body of evidence that may assist Appellant in showing that the prior correspondence, if not 
actually directed to the Secretary of State's Office, at the very least should have been under 
pertinent rules and procedures. Further, the representation of the Department on Appellant's 
unemployment claim at the Industrial Commission stage, its handling of Appellant's records 
requests, and the instant litigation, by the same counsel places Respondent in a very unique 
position to choose the information to which Appellant has access, whereas the Department 
essentially has unfettered access to any and all documents concerning Appellant that are relevant 
to this case. Without the ability to obtain the possible evidence in the possession of the 
Department, Appellant was, and is, at a very significant disadvantage, to the extent that the 
inability to access said evidence in order to provide sufficient grounds under Rule 60(b)(6)'s 
general provisions to re-open this case. Therefore, the District Court was likewise in error in 
denying Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, and this Court should REVERSE and 
REMAND this matter to the District Court accordingly. 
Since: (1) Appellant did not know the extent of his damages and, therefore, discover a 
cause of action for Negligence until April 29, 2016 at the earliest, the date on which the Idaho 
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Industrial Commission issued its decision in Appellant's favor; (b) alternatively, Appellant's 
body of previous correspondence to the State of Idaho qualify as "tort claims" for the purposes of 
the Idaho Tort Claims Act and, if discovery were possible, could be determined, at a minimum, 
as being of such as nature that it should have been forwarded to the Secretary of State for 
consideration as a tort claim; ( c) the State's acknowledgment of Appellant's intent to litigate in 
response to said correspondence should estop the State from asserting lack of notice as a defense; 
and ( d) the fact that the District Court wrongfully denied Appellant its opportunity to conduct 
further discovery in order to support the aforementioned arguments, the District Court was in 
error in granting Respondents' Motion to Dismiss and denying Appellant's post-judgment 
motions. 
E. The District Court Erred in Denying Appellant the Opportunity to Present 
Testimony at the Hearing. 
Finally, the District Court did not allow Appellant to provide testimony at the hearing on 
the Post-judgment Motions, even though the Notice of Hearing reserved the right to do so, and a 
Notice had also been provided prior to the hearing. See Court Minutes (R. at 330-31); Notice of 
Intent to Present Testimony and Evidence. (R. at 236). This denied Appellant to opportunity to 
refute Respondent's discussion and characterization of the contents of Appellant's supporting 
declarations and the need for further discovery. As such, this matter should be vacated and 
remanded for those reasons as well. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
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WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the foregoing reasons, the District 
Court's judgment herein should be REVERSED and the matter REMANDED for further 
proceedings and a jury trial, as demanded in the Original Complaint. 
DATED this 21st day of December, 2018. 
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